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Abstract:  
Research aims: This study aims to investigate the effect of corporate social 
responsibility on earnings management by considering the impact of investor 
protection. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: This study’s population was plantation
companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange and Malaysia Stock Exchange. The 
period of this study was from 2012 to 2017. Moreover, the hypotheses testing 
technique used was multiple regression analysis. 
Research findings: This study’s results revealed that corporate social
responsibility disclosure and investor protection significantly affected earnings 
management. 
Theoretical contribution/Originality: These results support the ethics hypothesis 
stating that companies committed to ethics view earnings management unethical 
behavior. This study also verifies the relationship between legal systems and 
earnings management. 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Earnings Management; Investor 
Protection 
Introduction 
Earnings management does not harm investors but other company 
stakeholders, namely society, employees, local communities, and 
managers (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005). For example, earnings 
management carried out by Enron's top management harmed its 
stakeholders with employee termination, loss of employee pension funds, 
and reduced state tax revenue. Even earnings management hurt the 
Enron itself. Regarding this, earnings management can reduce stakeholder 
trust in the company. As a result, stakeholders will give negative 
responses to the company, such as increased pressure from shareholders, 
government sanctions, employee abandonment, consumer boycott, 
increased demand to reduce prices, reduced sales revenue, boycotts by 
environmental activists, and negative media coverage (Lin et al., 2016; 
Prior, Surroca, & Tribó, 2008). All these negative responses can threaten 
the sustainability of the company's operations.  
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Consequently, most investors have realized that business sustainability is more 
important than excellent financial performance over a certain period but is misleading 
(Timbate & Park, 2018; Yusrianti, Norma Habsari, & Prukumpai, 2016). In this case, 
companies should generate economic benefits and be ethically responsible for all 
stakeholders, especially society and the environment (Choi, Lee, & Park, 2013). 
Therefore, the focus of investors and other stakeholders is currently not only on 
financial reporting but also on corporate social and environmental responsibility 
reporting (Kolk, 2016). The previous studies’ results showed that corporate social
responsibility reporting could increase company reputation to stakeholders (Saeidi et al., 
2015). Furthermore, a socially responsible company tends to have good relationships 
with stakeholders and get support from stakeholders (Mohamed, Faouzi, & Olfa, 2014). 
Based on the ethical perspective, the company reporting corporate social responsibility 
voluntarily upholds integrity, fairness, accountability, transparency, and corporate 
philanthropy (Chun, 2005). Meanwhile, the previous study result found that the 
company upholding ethical values would perceive earnings management as unethical 
behavior (Elias, 2004). Therefore, some previous studies uncovered that company 
management reporting corporate social responsibility activities tended not to do 
earnings management (Ajina, Lakhal, & Ayed, 2019; Ben Amar & Chakroun, 2018; 
Jordaan, De Klerk, & De Villiers, 2018; Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012; Saeed, Hashmi, & Javid, 
2019). 
However, Sun et al. (2010) found that one of management's motives to report corporate 
social responsibility activities is to divert the attention of investors and potential 
investors from earnings management done by management. Company management 
utilizes corporate social responsibility reporting as a mask to secure their jobs and avoid 
monitoring by stakeholders, especially investors (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). The previous 
study revealed a positive relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
earnings management (Habbash & Haddad, 2019; López-González, Martinez-Ferrero, & 
García-Meca, 2019; Prior et al., 2008). 
The various previous studies’ results regarding the effect of corporate social
responsibility on earnings management indicated that this issue still needs to be 
examined. The previous studies showed that earnings management as management 
fraud and corporate social responsibility as management discretion must be examined 
by considering the specific company characteristics and the environment in which the 
company operates (Ehsan, Abbas, & Nawaz, 2018; Kyaw, Olugbode, & Petracci, 2017; 
Moratis & van Egmond, 2018). The institutional factor in which the company operates 
can also influence the choice of policy taken by management, including whether to do 
earnings management or not. The different protection of investors' rights by every 
country distinguishes management behavior in violating investors' rights, including 
earnings management (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Previous studies revealed that 
investor protection negatively affected earnings management, meaning that strong 
investor protection can limit management fraud effectively (Chen, Chou, & Wei, 2019; 
Kouki, 2018; Lourenço et al., 2018). The previous studies also exposed that the specific 
characteristics could distinguish the level of earnings management, such as leverage 
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(Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003; Marcel Martins Ardison, Lopo 
Martinez, & Caio Galdi, 2012). 
Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the effect of corporate social responsibility 
disclosures and investor protection on earnings management. This study was conducted 
because the previous studies’ results related to the relationship between corporate
social responsibility and earnings management could not be concluded. This study 
considers new variables in the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
earnings management, namely investor protection as another independent variable and 
leverage as a control variable. Considering the variable of company and institutional 
characteristics aimed to answer the differences in the previous studies’ results so far
related to corporate social responsibility and earnings management. According to Shen 
and Chih (2005), earnings management could differ between countries and firm sizes 
because strong investor protection could limit earnings management, and large firms 
are more vulnerable to the spotlight of authority than small firms.  
To the best of researchers' knowledge, only one study considers the effect of investor 
protection and corporate social responsibility on earnings management, which is the 
study of Scholtens and Kang (2013). Still, the study was conducted before the enactment 
of global accounting standards, International Financial Reporting Standards. However, 
the current study was conducted in the period after Indonesia and Malaysia adopted 
International Financial Reporting Standards in 2012. Therefore, this study is different 
from previous studies. 
Further, this study was conducted on companies operating in the plantation sector listed 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange and Malaysia Stock Exchange. The reason for plantation 
companies was chosen as this research’s main subject is that plantation companies are
industrial sectors whose operational activities directly impact the community and the 
surrounding environment. Other than that, Indonesia and Malaysia are the largest palm 
oil-producing countries that commit eco-friendly. Indonesia and Malaysia have taken the 
initiative to establish Council Palm Oil Producing Countries in 2016. Interestingly, 
Indonesia and Malaysia have regulated corporate social responsibility reporting in 2006 
and 2007, respectively. Still, plantation companies' cases of environmental destruction 
in Indonesia and Malaysia are prevalent, such as forest fires for land clearing. Therefore, 
this study aimed to investigate the effect of corporate social responsibility disclosures 
and investor protection on earnings management in Indonesia and Malaysia plantation 
companies.  
In addition, this study has theoretical implications for a new paradigm regarding the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and earnings management at the 
country level, thus paving the way for accounting theory and international business. This 
study’s results can also open the paradigm of stakeholders, especially investors, to
encourage firms to be ethically responsible for local communities, the environment, and 
economic benefits. Finally, this study can guide investors and potential investors in 
assessing the firms’ financial reporting transparency by considering the firm's
characteristics and the institutional environment in which the firm operates.  
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory 
The relationship between corporate social responsibility and earnings management can 
be explained based on the agency and stakeholder theory framework (Prior, Jorge, & 
Tribó, 2007). Agency theory focuses on the agency relationship between shareholders 
and management. Management is an agent who is entrusted with managing the firm. 
Meanwhile, shareholders as principals are parties who delegate their authority to 
management. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), management tends to behave 
opportunistically and be selfish because management has different interests from 
shareholders. As a result of the agency relationship, information asymmetry allows 
management to steal profits from shareholders (Richardson, 2000). In addition, 
management as a party with more information about the company can manipulate 
information provided to shareholders so that shareholders are wrong in making 
decisions (Mayapada, 2018). However, management must take these opportunistic 
actions carefully so that management is not acted upon by shareholders, including using 
corporate social responsibility to mislead shareholders of the real value of the firm and 
its real performance (Ajina et al., 2019). 
In the context of agency theory, earnings management can be viewed as an agency cost 
(Chandren, 2016). Management can perform earnings management because the 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders allows management to 
manipulate information reported to shareholders, including earnings figures 
(Richardson, 2000). Meanwhile, earnings figures are one of the primary considerations 
for shareholders  in assessing management performance and making investment 
decisions. Therefore, earnings management can result in shareholders wrongly assessing 
management performance, investment decisions, and eventually making shareholders 
suffer losses (Zahra et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, according to Freeman (1984), stakeholder theory does not only focus on 
the relationship between management and shareholders, but also other parties affected 
by the company's operational activities. Therefore, management must not only focus on 
its relationship with shareholders but also all other company stakeholders, including the 
community and the surrounding environment that have provided locations and 
resources. Therefore, stakeholder theory states that a company can survive by aligning 
all its stakeholders’ interests, not only shareholders but also the community and the
surrounding environment (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Corporate social responsibility is a concept based on stakeholder theory (Brown & 
Forster, 2013). Corporate social responsibility is a form of fulfilling the firm’s moral and
ethical obligations to a society and the environment (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). 
Communities and the environment as stakeholders have contributed to the firms in 
providing the firms location and resources (Hill & Jones, 1992). In return, the firms have 
a moral and ethical obligation to pay attention to the interests of society and the 
environment through community empowerment and environmental conservation. Such 
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firms also run their business with integrity and tend to provide reliable financial 
statements to meet the needs of stakeholders (Gras-Gil et al., 2016). This is because the 
firms are not only focused on increasing current profits but also focused on fostering 
future relationships with stakeholders (Chih et al., 2008). Building good relationships 
with stakeholders is important because stakeholders control the firms’ resources that
are essential for the firms’ existence (Choi et al., 2013).
Hypotheses 
The previous studies revealed two perspectives regarding the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and earnings management (Choi et al., 2013; Chun & Cho, 
2017; Jordaan et al., 2018). The first perspective is called the ethical hypothesis or long-
term perspective based on the stakeholder theory. The ethical hypothesis is based on 
the idea that the issue of corporate social responsibility is related to ethical and moral 
issues in decision making. Therefore, ethics plays a vital role in controlling earnings 
management behavior (Labelle, Makni Gargouri, & Francoeur, 2010). On the other hand, 
another perspective believes that corporate social responsibility is merely a tool for 
management to gain a good reputation from stakeholders. In this case, excellent 
support from stakeholders can be used by management to behaving opportunistically 
(Jordaan et al., 2018). Therefore, this perspective is called the political or opportunistic 
behavior hypothesis based on the agency theory. 
The ethical hypothesis assumes that management carries out corporate social 
responsibility based on awareness of ethical and moral issues in organizational decision-
making (Liu et al., 2017). The company that carries out corporate social responsibility is 
the company that does not focus only on profit maximization but also on building a good 
relationship with all stakeholders (Chih, Shen, & Kang, 2008; Kolk, 2016; Lin et al., 2016). 
Management realizes that stakeholders control all resources needed by the company to 
exist (Gras-Gil, Palacios Manzano, & Hernández Fernández, 2016). Thus, management 
who carries out corporate social responsibility tends to avoid all actions which harm all 
stakeholders, including shareholders. Also, corporate social responsibility reporting can 
increase the transparency of corporate financial reporting so that information 
asymmetry between management and stakeholders is minimized (Elkington, 2013; 
Scholtens & Kang, 2013). Therefore, corporate social responsibility is assumed to be able 
to reduce earnings management carried out by management. 
On the other side, the previous study’s results revealed that corporate social
responsibility could increase the company's reputation (Lin et al., 2016). The company 
will get support from all stakeholders, such as getting good news from media, legitimacy 
from society, and favorable regulation (Prior et al., 2007). This condition can be utilized 
by management to behaving opportunistically. Management uses corporate social 
responsibility as a tool to divert stakeholder’s attention and secure their jobs (Kim et al.,
2012; Prior et al., 2008; Shafai, Amran, & Ganesan, 2018). Therefore, the political 
hypothesis states that generally, the companies that are very proactive in corporate 
social responsibility reporting make earnings management more than the companies 
that are slightly seeking public attention. 
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Previous studies have disclosed that the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and earnings management was positive and significant (Habbash & 
Haddad, 2019; Jiang et al., 2013; López-González et al., 2019; Shafai et al., 2018). In 
contrast, Ajina et al. (2019); Ben Amar and Chakroun (2018); Cho and Chun (2016); Choi 
et al. (2013); García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2017); Gras-Gil et al. (2016); Jordaan et 
al. (2018); Kim et al. (2012); Saeed et al. (2019); Scholtens and Kang (2013) found that 
corporate social responsibility had a significant adverse effect on earnings management. 
Therefore, the researchers formulated the following hypothesis: 
H1: Corporate social responsibility disclosure has a significant negative effect on earnings 
management 
Further, earnings management is an action intentionally carried out by management in 
presenting misguided information about company performance so that shareholders 
change their decision (Schipper, 1989). Shareholders, as principals, have the right to 
obtain reliable and relevant information regarding the company’s performance from
management. Shareholders ensure their rights are fulfilled by designing good contracts 
that depend on the legal system and contract enforcement (La Porta et al., 1998). The 
legal system enforces contracts by acting on management, such as changing 
management (Chih et al., 2008). Several previous studies have exhibited that strong 
investor protection in a country could reduce the level of earnings management in the 
country (Burgstahler et al., 2006; García-Sánchez & García-Meca, 2017; La Porta et al., 
1998; Leuz et al., 2003; Mayapada, 2018). 
H2: Investor protection has a significant negative effect on earnings management 
Research Method 
Population and Sample 
This study's population was plantation companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
and the Malaysia Stock Exchange. Plantation companies were chosen because they are 
one of the industrial sectors that directly impact the community and the surrounding 
environment. Besides, most forest fire issues in Indonesia and Malaysia in recent years 
have been caused by the opening of plantation land, mainly oil palm plantations. 
Furthermore, Indonesia and Malaysia are the two leading players in the oil palm 
industry (Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). In addition, 
Indonesia and Malaysia are also the initiators of forming a palm oil-producing unity state 
institution (Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016). Hence, it is 
interesting to investigate the social responsibility of plantation companies in Indonesia 
and Malaysia amid the controversy over forest fires that are plaguing both. Also, the 
population includes cross-country companies because one of the research variables is an 
institutional factor, investor protection at the country level.  
Muliati, Mayapada, & Pattawe 
Do Corporate Social Responsibility and Investor Protection Limit Earnings Management? …
Journal of Accounting and Investment, 2021 | 488 
Based on the data obtained, the total plantation companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange were eight companies. Meanwhile, the entire plantation companies 
listed in the Malaysia Stock Exchange were 43 companies. Therefore, the total 
population of this study was 51 companies. This study period covered 2012 until 2017. 
This period was selected because Indonesia and Malaysia have fully adopted IFRS as 
their accounting standards since 2012. Therefore, Indonesia and Malaysia have the 
same accounting standards, so that comparing accrual earnings management between 
Indonesia and Malaysia can be done well. 
The sampling technique was carried out using purposive sampling. One sample criterion 
included that the plantation companies had been listed on the stock exchange since 
before 2010. This criterion was based on the reason that the earnings management 
behavior will be different if the company has just made an initial public offering. 
Besides, another requirement is that sample companies had to have the same financial 
reporting period and ended on December 31. Furthermore, companies that experienced 
losses from 2012 to 2017 were also excluded from the sample because the company 
that lost had another tendency in managing earnings. Also, companies that did not 
provide complete data for this study were excluded from the sample. Based on the 
sampling criteria, the numbers of plantation companies that met the requirements were 
13 companies consisting of four companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and 
nine companies listed on the Malaysia Stock Exchange. 









Plantation companies listed on the exchange since 2010 (population) 8 43 51 
The financial statements do not have one year period and do not 
end on December 31. 
(0) (18) (18) 
Plantation companies suffered losses during the period under study 
(in 2012 - 2017) 
(4) (12) (16) 
Plantation companies do not publish complete data. (0) (4) (4) 
Total samples 4 9 13 
Total research observations (2012-2017) 24 54 78 
Variable Measurement 
This study consisted of one dependent variable and two independent variables. The 
dependent variable was earnings management. Earnings management is a change in 
economic performance reported by management to mislead stakeholders and influence 
contractual outcomes (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Earnings management can be done by 
utilizing accounting standards or through real company transactions. However, 
management prefers accrual earnings management because manipulating financial 
statements is carried out without violating accounting standards (Leuz et al., 2003). In 
this study, earnings management was proxied through the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals calculated based on the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1995). 
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The primary independent variable in this study was corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. According to Carroll (1999), corporate social responsibility is the social 
responsibility of a business that includes responsibility in terms of economy, law, ethics, 
and wisdom, which society expects from an organization at a specific time. The company 
usually discloses corporate social responsibility activities to stakeholders in a written 
report. Corporate social responsibility disclosure in a written report is regulated based 
on defined standards that have been developed by many non-profit organizations in the 
world as financial statements are prepared based on accounting standards. 
In this study, corporate social responsibility disclosure referred to the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) standards, especially GRI G4. The measurement of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure used a content analysis method (Hamid & Atan, 2011; Sumiani, 
Haslinda, & Lehman, 2007). The researchers analyzed each content related to corporate 
social responsibility topics based on the GRI G4 standards in annual reports, separate 
corporate social responsibility reports (if any), and the company’s website. The
corporate social responsibility disclosure index was then calculated by a non-weighted 
average index (Ghazali, 2007; Rosli, Said, & Fauzi, 2015). The following formula for 
corporate social responsibility disclosure index is: 
Corporate social responsibility disclosure index = (Total items disclosed)/ (Total items should 
have been disclosed) 
The other primary independent variable in this study was investor protection. According 
to La Porta et al. (1998), investor protection can be seen from the legal system applied 
in a country. Based on the previous study result, common law is better than civil law in 
protecting investor rights (Leuz et al., 2003). Civil law is a legal system codified in the 
form of written law. Common law is a legal system dominated by unwritten law and 
judge decisions in the past. Judges’ decisions in courts in civil law countries must be
based on written rules so that management can take advantage of existing written rules 
loopholes to do fraudulent actions against outside shareholders and other stakeholders. 
In contrast, the judges in the courts in common law countries are given the freedom to 
interpret the existing rules and judges’ decisions broadly in the past to decide on a case
even though it has not been regulated in the written regulations yet. Therefore, investor 
protection was proxied by a dummy variable, in which 1 representing common law 
countries and 0 signifying civil law countries (Mayapada, 2018; Wulandari & Ayu, 2010). 
Meanwhile, leverage as a control variable was calculated by dividing the company's total 
debt and total assets (Kyaw et al., 2017; Prior et al., 2007, 2008). 
Data Analysis Method 
This study involved four variables: earnings management (EM), corporate social 
responsibility disclosure (CSRD), investor protection (InvPro), and leverage (Lev). Based 
on that, the data analysis method employed in this study was the multiple linear 
regression analysis with a common effect model. Therefore, the equation of multiple 
linear regression analysis in this study is as follows: 
EMi = a + b1 CSRDi,t+ b2 InvProi,t + b3 Levi,t + e ...........................................................(1) 
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Result and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables in this study using transformed 
data in Indonesia and Malaysia because the original data had normality problems. The 
Table 2 shows that the average natural log of earnings management value was -1.4411. 
The minimum value of earnings management was owned by one of the sample 
companies listed on the Malaysia Stock Exchange, while the highest value was owned by 
one of the sample companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. These results 
indicate that the level of earnings management varied between countries, one of which 
could be expected to be influenced by the level of investor protection applied in the 
states. Meanwhile, the maximum score of corporate social responsibility disclosure was 
obtained by most Malaysian companies, the majority of which made corporate social 
responsibility reports separately and based on GRI standards. However, not all 
Malaysian companies reported their CSR well, as indicated by the minimum score 
obtained by a Malaysian company. The Malaysian company did not disclose its 
corporate social responsibility activities well throughout this study period. Meanwhile, 
the company with the highest leverage value came from Malaysia, and the lowest 
leverage value came from the Indonesian company. The Table 2 also displays that most 
of the sample of this study were plantation companies listed on the Malaysia Stock 
Exchange, reaching almost 70%. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Error 
LnEM 6.60 -5.32 1.29 -1.4411 0.09733 
LnCSRD 1.37 -1.37 0.00 -0.7422 0.04565 
InvPro 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.6923 0.05260 
LnLev 3.03 -3.34 -0.32 -1.6021 0.09067 
N=78 
Empirical Results 
Table 3 shows that the correlation coefficient (R) in this study was 0.508, meaning that 
the level of relationship between the variables of this study was quite strong. 
Meanwhile, the adjusted R square value of 0.228 indicates that 22.8% of the variability 
of earnings management variables was explained by the variability of corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, investor protection, and leverage. Meanwhile, 77.2% (100%-
22.8%) was explained by other variables not examined in this study. 
Table 3 also provides the simultaneous influence test results to determine whether the 
independent variables jointly influenced the dependent variable. The simultaneous 
effect test results also represented the feasibility of the research model developed.  
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Table 3 The Empirical Results 
Variable Unstandardized Coefficients (Beta) t Sig. 
(Constant) -1.458 -6.097 0.000 
LnCSRD -0.678 -3.139 0.002* 
InvPro -0.851 -3.992 0.000* 
LnLev -0.064 -0.514 0.609 
R = 0.508 Adj. R Squared = 0.228 
T-test results indicated the effect of each independent variable on the dependent
variable. Of the three independent variables included in the model, only the Ln Leverage
variable was not significant at 0.05. In contrast, other independent variables, Ln
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure and Investor Protection, were all significant,
with values less than 0.05. These results concluded that Ln Corporate Social
Responsibility Disclosure and Investor Protection influenced Ln Earnings Management.
The Ln Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure regression coefficient of -0.678 stated 
that each increase in corporate social responsibility disclosure by 1% would reduce the 
level of earnings management by 0.678%. Meanwhile, the Investor Protection variable's 
regression coefficient of -0.851 indicated that Ln Earnings Management of plantation 
companies in common law country, namely Malaysia, was 0.851 lower than Ln Earnings 
Management of plantation companies located in civil law, namely Indonesia.  
Discussion 
This study found that corporate social responsibility disclosure had a significant adverse 
effect on earnings management. This empirical result supports the perspective that 
companies carry out corporate social responsibility because of the ethical awareness in 
doing business. On the contrary, this empirical result contradicts the political 
hypothesis, stating that companies carry out corporate social responsibility only to 
obtain support from all stakeholders and as a camouflage of earnings management done 
by management. Therefore, this empirical result is not in line with the research findings 
of (Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Gargouri, Shabou, & Francoeur, 2010; Jiang et al., 2013; 
Moratis & van Egmond, 2018; Prior et al., 2008; Yip, Van Staden, & Cahan, 2011). 
However, this empirical result is similar to the conclusion of previous studies, which also 
support the ethical hypothesis, such as Cho and Chun (2016); Choi et al. (2013) in 
Korean-listed firms, Chih et al. (2008) in firms in 46 countries around the world, Garcia-
Sanchez and Garcia-Meca (2017) with bank samples, Gras-Gil et al. (2016) in Spanish 
non-financial companies, Jordaan et al. (2018) in South African companies, Hong and 
Andersen (2011) with non-financial US sample firms, and Scholtens and Kang (2013) 
with firms in ten Asian countries including Malaysia. 
Furthermore, companies with a solid commitment to ethics will not hesitate to report 
their corporate social responsibility activities to stakeholders as a form of public 
accountability. The more transparent financial statements, the lower incentive 
management to do earnings management is (Shen & Chih, 2005). Companies that carry 
out corporate social responsibility consider earnings management an irresponsible 
action that does not follow ethics (Mohamed et al., 2014). Therefore, companies that 
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report corporate social responsibility well tend not to do earnings management in their 
financial statements. 
The ethical hypothesis related to the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and earnings management is based on the idea that ethical companies will 
always strive to maximize all stakeholders’ interests without harming any stakeholders.
Corporate social responsibility is closely related to moral and ethical issues between 
policymakers and company behavior (Rahmawati & Dianita, 2011). Companies that 
uphold ethical values in business realize that the company’s goal is not only to maximize
profit and meet the expectations of shareholders but also to add value to the around 
community and environment (Chih et al., 2008). The company's sustainability cannot be 
separated from the support of all stakeholders, so that the company must ensure that 
the company’s operational activities do not harm the around communities and
environment. The research result by Ahmed Haji (2013) revealed that the extent and 
quality of CSR disclosures in Malaysia experienced a significant increase in the recent 
decade. The majority of firms in Malaysia disclosed their CSR activities through 
narratives in annual reports (Ahmad, Rashid, & Gow, 2017). Meanwhile, CSR disclosures 
in Indonesia have been required by the government through Law No. 40 of 2007 
concerning Limited Liability Companies, emphasizing firms with a direct impact on the 
environment, such as plantation firms. However, Ridho (2017) showed that most 
management in Indonesia only understood CSR as activities related to donations and 
community development. In addition, most firms in Indonesia also reported their CSR 
activities through annual reports and websites. 
Moreover, the research result by Shen and Chih (2007) revealed that the level of 
earnings management carried out by firms in Indonesia was higher than that of 
Malaysian firms. Shen and Chih (2007) also found that it was influenced by corporate 
governance. This result aligns with Wu et al.'s (2016) finding, which showed that the 
level of earnings management in Malaysian banks was the lowest among other 
Southeast Asia countries. 
This study also verifies the stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory states that a 
company should be able to accommodate all stakeholders’ interests. Company
stakeholders are not only shareholders but also suppliers, customers, regulators around 
the community, and the environment. All these stakeholders play an essential role in 
supporting the company’s operations. Without the support of all company stakeholders,
the company will not be able to exist and obtain maximum profits because the 
company’s activities are disrupted.
Table 3 also displays that investor protection proxied by the legal system had a 
significant positive effect on earnings management. This finding means that investor 
protection could restrict earnings management done by management. This result also 
revealed that common law was better in protecting investor rights than civil law. This 
result is in line with the result of previous studies, such as Chih et al. (2008); Houqe et al. 
(2012); Leuz et al. (2003); Mayapada (2018); Renders and Gaeremynck (2007); Shen and 
Chih (2005); Wulandari and Ayu (2010). 
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When investors fund companies, they face a risk of controlling shareholders and 
company management taking over the returns (La Porta et al., 1998). The takeover 
returns can be done in various ways by management, such as earnings management; 
according to Leuz et al. (2003), management and controlling shareholders as insiders 
use earnings management to obtain private control benefits. Therefore, fair financial 
reporting is vital for outside shareholders and creditors to monitor their claims and 
achieve contracts effectively. All investors' claims can only be realized if the investors’
rights are appropriately regulated and protected by the legal rules in the country where 
the company operates. 
On the other hand, the legal rules between countries in the world are different from one 
another. As a result, the level of investor protection also differs between countries 
(Graff, 2007). The legal system that forms the level of investor protection in a country is 
also different. This study suggests that common law as a legal system in Malaysia is 
better in protecting investors’ rights than civil law as a legal system in Indonesia because
this study showed that the level of earnings management in common law countries was 
lower than in civil law countries. 
Concerning this, Malaysia was a British colony, so the legal system is common law. 
Accounting standards and reporting practices in Malaysia also reflect its colony history 
based on the Anglo-Saxon model (Likitwongkajon & Sutthachai, 2019). The mode 
emphasizes fair presentation, transparency, and full disclosure in financial reporting. In 
addition, two institutions regulate financial reporting in Malaysia, namely The Financial 
Reporting Foundation (FRF) and the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB). 
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s accounting environment is influenced by the Dutch with a
complex civil law. Indonesian accounting standards initially adopted the Dutch 
accounting standard, then the US system, and converged to International Financial 
Reporting Standards in 2012. 
The research results by Klapper and Love (2004) found that Malaysia was superior in 
protecting shareholders' rights and judicial efficiency than Indonesia. It is inseparable 
from the kind of legal system. Therefore, the degree of earnings management in 
Malaysia was lower than in Indonesia. 
This study’s results also revealed that leverage did not have a significant effect on
earnings management. This result means that companies with high leverage do not 
always have a high level of earnings management. This result is different from the 
findings of Ali, Salleh, and Hassan (2008); DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994); Jiang et al. 
(2013); and Sawicki and Shrestha (2008). 
This result also does not support the perspective of positive accounting theory about 
incentives to manipulate income. Besides, debt holders usually provide several 
conditions to ensure that the company can pay interest and return the loan principal. 
However, this study’s results exposed that companies with leverage were not always
motivated to manage earnings to avoid debt agreements. While, according to Watts and 
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Zimmerman (1978), companies approaching a breach of contract will make accounting 
choices that increase revenue to relax their debt limits. 
Conclusion 
This study found that companies reporting corporate social responsibility activities 
upheld moral values and business ethics. Therefore, the companies would not do 
earnings management because they viewed earnings management as unethical 
behavior. This result supports the ethical hypothesis related to the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and earnings management. This study also uncovered 
that investor protection could limit earnings management. Besides, this study revealed 
that companies operating in common law countries had lower earnings management 
than companies operating in civil law countries. However, this result must be 
interpreted carefully because this study only involved plantation companies in Indonesia 
as civil law representatives and Malaysia as common law representatives. Therefore, the 
researchers suggest that the subsequent researchers expand the research population by 
adding countries representing common and civil law countries.  
Moreover, this study verifies the ethical hypothesis, which is in line with stakeholder 
theory. The firm is not only responsible to investors but also to the environment and 
society. However, the interpretation of this study must be made carefully because the 
research sample included plantation firms only. Therefore, the researchers suggest 
further research to expand the research sample. In addition, further research can use 
other measuring tools for earnings management variables, such as real earnings 
management, because the tendency of accrual earnings management behavior is 
different from real earnings management behavior. 
The implications of this study’s results consist of several essential things. First, this
study’s results indicated that shareholders should encourage companies to do corporate
social responsibility activities and report them because this study has proved that 
corporate social responsibility could reduce earnings management done by 
management. However, this research also revealed that investor protection through 
laws could limit the opportunistic behavior of management in earnings manipulation. 
Therefore, the researchers advise regulators to formulate rules that can effectively 
protect investor rights and even other corporate stakeholders’ rights.
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